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also	sheds	 light	on	 the	Stoic	debates	with	 their	sceptical	opponents	
and	grants	the	Stoics	an	epistemic	account	fit	for	purpose.
1. A Summary of the Evidence
Apprehension	(κατάληψις)	 lies	at	 the	centre	of	Stoic	epistemology.1 
Apprehension	occurs	when	one	gives	assent	to	a	kataleptic	appearance	
1.	 As	 commentators	 have	 noted,	 apprehension	 (κατάληψις)	 is	 akin	 to	 (how	
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(ἐναργής)	 and	 striking	 (πληκτική),	 all	 but	 grabs	 us	 by	
the	hair	and	draws	us	into	assent,	needing	nothing	else	to	
strike	us	in	this	way	or	to	suggest	its	difference	from	the	
others	 [i. e.	 the	non-kataleptic	appearances]	 (M. 7.257–8,	
trans.	Bett;	cf.	M. 7.405).	
This	 passage	 succinctly	 captures	 several	 of	 the	 qualities	 often	
attributed	 to	kataleptic	 appearances	 in	our	 sources:	 the	manner	 in	
which	 they	 command	 assent	 (M. 257;	 cf.	 Acad. 2.38);	 their	 clarity/
evidentness (ἐνάργεια)3	 or	 being clear/evident (ἐναργής,	 M. 7.227,	
257);	 their	being striking	 (πληκτική,	M. 258,	403);	 their	being intense 
(ἔντονος,	 M. 7.408);	 their	 being vivid	 (τρανής);	 and	 perhaps	 also	
their	 being distinct (ἔκτυπος,	D.L.	 7.46;	 cf.	M. 7.171).	While	 various	
predicates	are	employed,	it	is	not	immediately	clear	to	what	degree	
the	terms	vary	in	sense.
2. Scholarly Views of Stoic Epistemology
I	 will	 first	 outline	 and	 clarify	 the	 received	 views	 in	 the	 literature	
(section	2.1).	 I	will	 then	 (section	2.2)	 go	on	 to	 indicate	 some	of	 the	
problems	 certain	 causal	 externalist	 interpretations	 face	 and	 finally	
3.	 I	 use	 the	 somewhat	 barbaric	 term	 ‘evidentness’	 rather	 than	 ‘evidence’	 as	
these	days	we	most	often	use	‘evidence’	as	a	concrete	noun	for	a	piece of	evi-
dence	(e. g.	OED,	s.v.	4,	5a.–c.,	6a.–c.),	but	this	is	misleading	here.
(φαντασία	 καταληπτική, S.E.	M.	 7.151;	 8.397).	 For	 the	 Stoics,	 an	
appearance	is	kataleptic	iff it:
(i)			 ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος	(LS	trans.	“arises	from	what	is”);











2.	 M.	7.248:	ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος	καὶ	κατ’	αὐτὸ	τὸ ὑπάρχον	ἐναπομεμαγμένη	
καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη,	ὁποία	οὐκ	ἂν	γένοιτο	ἀπὸ	μὴ ὑπάρχοντος.	Cf.	M. 
7.402,	426. 
 M. 11.183:	 [...]	 καταληπτική	 ἐστι,	 τῷ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος	γενέσθαι	καὶ	 κατ’	
αὐτὸ	τὸ ὑπάρχον	ἐναπομεμαγμένως	καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένως. 
	 D.L.	7.46:	ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος	κατ’	αὐτὸ	τὸ ὑπάρχον	ἐναπεσφραγισμένην	
καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην.
	 D.L.	 7.50:	 [ἡ]	 φαντασία	 ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος	 κατὰ	 τὸ ὑπάρχον	
ἐναπομεμαγμένη	καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη	καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη,	οἵα	οὐκ	
ἂν	γένοιτο	ἀπὸ	μὴ ὑπάρχοντος.	This	is	repeated	word	for	word	at	PH. 2.4.










with	that very thing [emphasis	mine]	which	is	[...]	of	a	kind	which	could	not	
arise	from	what	is	not”.	
	 Bett	 (2005:	 50):	 “from	 a	 real	 thing	 and	 is	 stamped	 and	 impressed	 in	 ac-
cordance	with	just	that real	thing,	and	is	of	such	a	kind	as	could	not	come	
about	from	a	thing	that	was	not	real”.	




2.2 Criticisms of Purely Externalist Causal Interpretations
While	purely	externalist	interpretations	form	the	dominant	view,	they	




appearances	 are	 always	 followed	 by	 assent	 (e. g.	 Striker	 1990).	
However,	 there	 are	 numerous	 cases	 discussed	 in	 the	 texts	 where	





The	 second	 problem	 is	 that	 if	 the	 externalist	 interpretations	
are	 correct,	 then	 the	Academic	attacks	miss	 the	mark.	Such	attacks	
generally	 assume	 some	 form	 of	 internalism	 in	 the	 notion	 of	
apprehension	they	are	attacking	and	ask,	for	instance,	how	one	will	
tell	apart	the	kataleptic	from	the	non-kataleptic	(e. g.	M. 7.408–11,	415–








8.	 This	 shows	only	 that	kataleptic	appearances	are	not	necessarily	 followed	
by	 assent,	 not	 that	 kataleptic	 appearances	 fail	 to	 cause	 assent.	 However,	
as	mentioned	above,	those	holding	the	doubly	causal	interpretation	often	
seem	 to	 think	 that	 kataleptic	 appearances	 are	 always	 followed	 by	 assent,	





2.1 Frede’s (Doubly) Causal, Externalist Account















(or	 that	by	which	 the	 causal	 influence	 is	 exercised)	 are	not	 features	
which	S need	be	directly	aware	of	or	have	access	 to	 (1983:	83),	and,	








5.	 I	 introduce	 the	 nomenclature	 because	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 simple 
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is	 meant	 to	 apply	 only	 to	 Zeno	 and	 not	 to	 later	 Stoics	 (such	 as	
Chrysippus);12	 however,	 since	 the	 principal	 problems	 Sedley	 raises	







that	 in	 order	 to	 be	 kataleptic,	 an	 appearance	 should	 be	 “ἀπὸ 
ὑπάρχοντος”.	This	has	often	been	taken	to	specify	that	the	appearance	
should	 be	 appropriately	 caused	 by	 its	 object	 (e. g.	 LS:	 “arises	 from	
what	is”):	if	A is	ἀπό	(“from”)	B,	then	A is	caused	by	B.	Given	that	the	









and	 of	 apprehension.	 In	 particular,	 one	 might	 think	 that	 a	 causal	
12.	 Sedley	 recognises	 that	 later	Stoics	maintained	a	causal	account	 (2002:	 136,	
139,	148).












evidentness,	and	 the	 like	 to	kataleptic	appearances	 (see	above)	and	
this	 sounds	 obviously,	 undeniably	 internalist	 because	 it	 is	 natural	
enough	to	suppose	that	if	A is	clear/evident	to	S,	then	this	is	a	feature	
of	A which	 is	 accessible	 to	 S.	 Those	 who	 think	 that	 the	 Stoics	 are	
externalists	 must	 make	 intelligible	 the	 notion	 that	 A being	 clear/
evident	to	S	is	compatible	with	the	clarity/evidentness	of	A not	being	
something	S is	even	potentially	aware	of.9
The	 fourth	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 purely	 externalist	 interpretation	
poses	 wider	 difficulties	 for	 Stoic	 epistemology.10	 If	 one	 should	









of	 the	 kataleptic	 appearance.11	 Sedley’s	 non-causal	 interpretation	
9.	 This	has	not	been	done.	Either	the	attributions	of	clarity,	etc.	are	simply	ne-




11.	 Drawing	attention	 to	 the	representational	sense	of	 ‘ἀπό’	 in	Greek,	Sedley	
(2002:	142ff)	argues	that,	as	far	as	Zeno	is	concerned,	the	preposition	‘ἀπό’	
should	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘from’	 but	 as	 ‘of’.	 This	 prompts	 a	 non-caus-
al,	representational	reading	(if	A is	ἀπό	B, A is	“of”	B:	A represents	B).	On	





outline	how	 things	are,	but	vividly	portrays	 the	 thing	or	 situation	 in	pan-
oramic	detail”	(2002:	147–8).














this	 property	 allows	 the	 agent	 who	 is	 having	 the	 appearance	 to	
differentiate	between	kataleptic	and	non-kataleptic	appearances.18
17.	 It	is	usual	to	speak	of	a	truth	stipulation,	but	I	prefer	to	talk	of	accuracy.	A	
kataleptic	 appearance	 should	be	 formed	 in accordance with	 (κατὰ,	 LSJ	 s.v.,	






















as	 is	 often	 acknowledged	 (e. g.	 Sedley	 2002:	 147),	 there	 is	 some awkward-
ness	in	the	Greek	on	all	hitherto	proposed	readings	of	(iii)	(cf.	n32	below).	
interpretation	 limits	 the	 scope	 of	 apprehension	 to	 instances	 of	
perception.15	 If	 apprehension	 occurs	 only	 by	 means	 of	 kataleptic	
appearances,	 and	 one	 can	 have	 a	 kataleptic	 appearance	 only	 if	 it	
is	 appropriately	 caused,	 and	 only	 perceptions	 are	 appropriately	
caused,	then	(the	thought	goes)	it	is	hard	to	see	how	(e. g.)	theological	
truths	 or	 mathematical	 truths	 might	 be	 apprehended.	 Accordingly,	
Sedley	 proposes	 that	 excising	 the	 causal	 element	 easily	 allows	 for	
non-perceptual	 kataleptic	 appearances	 and	 hence	 easily	 allows	 for	
apprehension	 of	 (e. g.)	 theological	 truths,	 or	 the	 truths	 of	 logic	 or	
mathematics.
3. A Causal and Internalist Account of Apprehension
I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 kataleptic	 appearance	 is	 best	
read	 as	 attributing	 to	 the	 Stoics	 a	 (simple)	 causal	 account	 which	
incorporated	 an	 internalist	 element.16	A	 kataleptic	 appearance	must	
be	 appropriately	 caused	 (by	 the	 object	 of	 the	 appearance),	 but	 the	





On	my	 reading,	 we	 should	 render	 the	 three	 conditions	 thought	
individually	necessary	and	jointly	sufficient	for	an	appearance	to	be	
kataleptic	as	follows:
(i)	 	 ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος,	 “is	 caused	 by	 what	 is”	 (cf.	 LS:	 “arises	
from	what	is”);
(ii)		 κατ’	 αὐτὸ	 τὸ ὑπάρχον	 ἐναπομεμαγμένη	 καὶ 
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of	 being	 clear/evident	 while	 responding	 to	 the	 objections	 to	 an	
internalist	interpretation	(OBJ	3	&	4).	
3.1 Causation
A	 defence	 of	 a	 causal	 interpretation	 requires,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	
a	 defence	 of	 a	 causal	 reading	 of	 the	 preposition	 ‘ἀπό’	 employed	





is	 the	 more	 common,	 but,	 more	 significantly,	 it	 seems	 fairly	 clear	
that	this	was	the	manner	in	which	‘ἀπό’	was	understood	in	relevant	
contexts	by	Chrysippus.	Pointedly,	when	describing	a	hallucination,	
Chrysippus	uses	 ‘ἀπό’	 to	discuss	 the	causal	origin	of	such	a	mental	
state:	 “Imagination	 is	 an	 empty	 attraction,	 an	 affection	 in	 the	 soul	
which	arises	from (ἀπό)	no	impressor”	(φανταστικὸν	δέ	ἐστι	διάκενος	
ἑλκυσμός,	 πάθος	 ἐν	 τῇ	 ψυχῇ ἀπ’	 οὐδενὸς	 φανταστοῦ	 γινόμενον	
Aetius	 4.12.1ff	 =	 LS	 39B).	 Further,	 Chrysippus’	 account	 is	 explicitly	
causal	 for,	 in	 describing	 appearances	 (in	 general),	 he	 privileges	 a	
causal	role,	and	defines	an	appearance	as	“an	affect	occurring	in	the	
soul,	which	reveals	in	itself	its	cause”	(φαντασία	μὲν	οὖν	ἐστι	πάθος	
ἐν	 τῇ	 ψυχῇ	 γιγνόμενον,	 ἐνδεικνύμενον	 ἐν	 αὑτῷ	 καὶ	 τὸ	 πεποιηκός·	
Aetius	 4.12.1ff	 =	 LS	 39B).20	 Insofar	 as	 kataleptic	 appearances	 are	
appearances,	it	seems	clear	that,	at	least	for	Chrysippus,	appropriate	
causation	is	essential	to	them.	
Further,	 notice	 that	 while	 on	 my	 interpretation	 (i)	 stipulates	
causation,	 (ii)	 adds	 further	 support	 for	 this.	 (ii)	 stipulates	 that	 a	
kataleptic	appearance	need	be	“stamped	and	impressed	in	accordance	
with	that very thing	which	is”	(κατ’	αὐτὸ	τὸ ὑπάρχον	ἐναπομεμαγμένη	




In	 addition	 to	 doing	 justice	 to	 the	 textual	 evidence,	 such	 an	
interpretation	must	 attempt	 to	 respond	 to	 some	 of	 the	 objections	
levelled	 against	 both	 causal	 and	 internalist	 interpretations.	 This	
assumes	 central	 importance	 because	 these	 objections	 are	 the	
principal	 motivators	 for	 alternative	 accounts.	 To	 recap,	 the	
noteworthy	objections	raised	against	a	(simple)	causal	interpretation	
were	as	follows:
(OBJ1)	 the	 superfluity	 of	 (i);	 if	 (i)	 means	 that	 the	
appearance	 should	 be	 caused	 by	 something	 that	 exists	
(as	 opposed	 to	 something	 that	 does	 not	 exist),	 then	 it	
hardly	needed	specifying;




Further,	 the	 objections	 against	 an	 internalist	 interpretation	were	 as	
follows:
(OBJ3) a	 worry	 about	 how	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 talk	
of	 “automatic	 assent”	 (such	 talk	 was	 taken	 by	 Frede	 to	
indicate	externalism);
(OBJ4)	 a	 regress	 problem:	 if	 the	 Stoics	 are	 internalists	
they	 face	 a	 vicious	 regress	 problem	 (for	 the	 details	 of	




3.2),	discuss	 the	distinctive	quality	 that	kataleptic	 appearances	have	
The	benefits	of	the	interpretation	proposed	here	do,	I	think,	outweigh	the	
awkwardness.






the	 Stoics	without	 apprehension	 outside	 of	 instances	 of	 perception	
and	 thus	 without	 apprehension	 of	 non-empirical	 matters	 (such	 as	
theological	 or	mathematical	matters).	Were	 this	 true,	 it	would	 be	 a	
flaw	in	the	Stoic	position;	moreover,	there	is	textual	evidence	claiming	
that	 apprehension	 comes	 about	 not	 only	 by	 perception	but	 also	 by	
reason	 (D.L.	 7.52;	 cf.	Acad. 2.42).	 This	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 there	
is	 non-perceptual	 apprehension;	 hence	 non-perceptual	 kataleptic	
appearances;	hence	 the	causal	account	of	 the	kataleptic	appearance	
cannot	be	right.	
There	 are	 three	 inferences	 here,	 and	 each	 may,	 I	 think,	 be	
resisted.	First,	even	if	 lacking	non-perceptual	kataleptic	appearances	
is	 a	weakness	 in	 the	Stoic	position,	 this	may	 simply	be	 an	 accurate	
reflection	 of	 the	 Stoa.	 While	 non-perceptual	 appearances	 are	
mentioned	(D.L.	7.51),	there	is	no	explicit	discussion	of	non-perceptual	
kataleptic	 appearances.	 Despite	 the	 talk	 of	 apprehension	 occurring	
by	means	of	reason,	the	Stoics	associated	apprehension	closely	with	
perception,	 and	 certain	 passages	 imply	 that	 kataleptic	 appearances	
were	a	sub-set	of	perceptual	appearances	(e. g.	M. 7.424;	Acad. 1.40–1).23 
Most	plausibly,	the	Stoics	developed	their	epistemology	with	an	eye	
towards	accounting	for	knowledge	of	empirical	matters,	and	these	are	
the	cases	discussed	 in	greatest	detail.24	 (OBJ2)	 rests	upon	 it	being	a	

























the	kataleptic	appearance	 “is	 stamped	and	 impressed	 in	accordance	
with that very thing which	is”	(κατ’	αὐτὸ	τὸ ὑπάρχον	ἐναπομεμαγμένη	







that	 will	 be	 picked	 up	 in	 the	 second	 clause.	 Thus,	 the	 first	 clause	
specifies	that	a	kataleptic	appearance	has	to	be	caused	by	something.	
21.	 These	considerations	are	applicable	to	those	(e. g.	Perin	2005)	who	see	Chry-












Thirdly,	 suppose	 that	 apprehension	 were	 limited	 to	 assent	 to	
kataleptic	appearances	and	that	there	were	non-perceptual	kataleptic	
appearances.	(OBJ2)	sees	the	second	conjunct	as	weighing	decisively	
against	 the	 causal	 interpretation;	 a	 causal	 account	 is	 supposed	 to	
leave	 no	 room	 for	 non-perceptual	 kataleptic	 appearances.	However,	
this	is	too	hasty.	Appropriate	causation	requires	only	that	the	fact	that	






Finally,	 we	 should	 notice	 that	 even if all	 kataleptic	 appearances	
are	 perceptual,	 this	may	 not	 be	 quite	 so	 problematic	 for	 the	 Stoics	
as	proponents	of	 (OBJ2)	 suppose.	 (OBJ2)	 assumes	 that,	on	a	 causal	
interpretation,	the	Stoics	are	left	without	kataleptic	appearances	of	a	
number	of	important	matters	because	all	the	relevant	properties	(e. g.	
mathematical	 properties,	 theological	 properties,	 and	 probably	 also	
moral	 properties)	 are	 queer non-natural	 properties;	 they	 are	 queer	








27.	 For	 instance,	 in	 discussing	 divination,	 Posidonius	 seems	 to	 envision	 the	








Secondly,	 there	 being	 non-perceptual	 instances	 of	 apprehension	
need	not	entail	that	there	are	non-perceptual	kataleptic	appearances.	
Even if	 all	 kataleptic	 appearances	 are	 perceptual	 appearances,	 there	
may	 still	 be	 non-perceptual	 instances	 of	 apprehension;	 namely,	
we	 may	 apprehend	 things	 without	 perceiving	 them	 or	 having	 a	
kataleptic	 appearance.	Although	 at	M. 7.151	 apprehension	 is	 said	 to	
be	assent	 to	a	kataleptic	appearance	 (see	above),	 it	 is	not	clear	 that	
this	 is	meant	 to	 provide	 a	 conclusive	 or	 comprehensive	 account	 of	
apprehension.	Thus,	one	might	raise	the	case	of	our	apprehension	of	
(e. g.)	 logical	 truths	not	so	much	to	challenge	a	causal	 interpretation	
of	 the	 definition	 of	 kataleptic	 appearances	 but	 instead	 to	 challenge	
the	definition	of	apprehension	as	assent	to	a	kataleptic	appearance.26 
That	is	to	say,	assuming	that	all	kataleptic	appearances	are	perceptual	
appearances	 and	 that	 the	 Stoics	 were	 in	 fact	 concerned	 about	





by	Chrysippus	as	a	criterion	of	truth	(e. g.	Alex.	De mixt. 217.2–4	=	LS	
48C5; cf. D.L.	7.54)	 for	 less	straightforwardly	perceptual	matters	and	
why	 we	 do	 find	 some	 evidence	 discussing	 apprehension	 of	 (e. g.)	
preconceptions (e. g.	Cic.	Top. 31).	A	need	for	allowing	apprehension	
by	means	other	than	kataleptic	appearances	might	have	been	a	feature	
of	the	Stoic	theory	early	on,	or	it	might	have	been	impressed	upon	the	
25.	 This	 is	how	causal	accounts	of	knowledge	developed	 in	 the	mid-twentieth	
century	(cf.	Goldman	1967:	357).
26.	The	Stoics	may	have	 recognised	more	 than	one	 sense	of	 ‘κατάληψις’,	 and	
we	do	find	talk	of	how	one	might	be	said	to	apprehend	(καταλαμβάνειν)	a	
thesis	without	believing	it	(PH 2.1–12).
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truths	of	mathematics	or	 logic	 in	order	 to	defeat	global	 scepticism	
(e. g.	 the	thesis	 that	“nothing	can	be	apprehended”,	Acad. 1.45,	2.83)	
as	 Augustine	 later	 does	 (Contra Academicos 3.21ff).	 That	 they	 did	
not	 do	 so,	 coupled	with	 a	 seeming	 reticence	 to	 talk	 of	 our	 having	
kataleptic	appearances	of	mathematical	or	 logical	 truths	 (i. e.	 those	
cases	which	a	causal	account	seems	to	most	struggle	with),29	does	—	I	
think	—	suggest	 that	 it	 did	 not	 occur	 to	 them	 that	 their	 theory	 of	
apprehension	might	appeal	to	such	truths.
In	 sum,	 there	 is	 strong	 textual	 evidence	 favouring	 a	 causal	
interpretation	(at	least	from	Chrysippus	onwards),	and	the	objections	
raised	 against	 a	 causal	 interpretation	 may	 be	 overcome.30	 Further,	
one	should	notice	that	a	causal	interpretation	also	seems	to	attribute	
to	 the	 (relevant)	Stoics	a	 stronger	position	 than	existing	non-causal	
interpretations	do.	For	instance,	on	Sedley’s	non-causal	interpretation	
of	 Zeno,	 (i)	 and	 (ii)	 amount	 to	 stipulating	 that	 S has	 a	 kataleptic	








or	 apprehension	of	 a	proof	 (ἀπόδειξις),	 because	 it	 is	 incorporeal	 and	has	
no	causal	efficacy	(M. 8.400–410).	The	Stoics	are	 forced,	he	says,	 to	make	

























and	 the	 kataleptic	 appearance	 with	 an	 eye	 towards	 non-empirical	
matters;	 on	 the	 second,	 if	 we	 suppose	 that	 kataleptic	 appearances	
are	 perceptual,	 then	 we	 might	 suppose	 that	 there	 are	 instances	 of	
apprehension	that	are	attained	by	some	means	other	than	by	assenting	
to	kataleptic	appearances;	on	the	third,	supposing	that	there	are	non-
perceptual	 kataleptic	 appearances	 need	 not	 count	 against	 a	 causal	
interpretation,	 because	 not	 all	 appropriately	 caused	 appearances	






one	 need	 not	 decide	 between	 these	 responses.	 However,	 it	 is	
striking	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 the	 Stoics	 appealed	 to	 the	
28.	For	the	Stoics,	God	is	the	active	principle	and	cause	(τὸ	ποιοῦν,	D.L.	7.134);	
immanent	 rather	 than	 transcendent	 insofar	as	He	 is	mixed	 in	with	matter	
(e. g.	Alex.	Aphr.	Mixt. 225.1–2	=	LS	45H;	Stob.	1.138.14–139.14	=	LS	55A;	M. 
8.263,	9.211;	Acad. 1.39);	causally	responsible	for	bringing	about	the	order	of	
the	universe	(e. g.	Aetius	1.7.33	=	LS	46A);	and,	in	fact,	the	cause	of	all	things	
(Plut.	Stoic. repugn. 1056B	=	SVF	2.997	[LS	55R	part.];	Seneca	Ep. 65.12;	Stob.	
1.31.11	=	SVF	2.1062;	Augustine	Civ. Dei	5.8).
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7.141–260),36	 and	 the	 textual	 evidence	 for	 attributing	 the	 quality	 of	
being	clear/evident	to	Stoic	kataleptic	appearances	is	strong.	We	find	
that	kataleptic	appearances	are	 said	 to	be	 clear/evident (ἐναργής,	M. 
7.227,	257)	or	possess	clarity/evidentness (ἐνάργεια,	cf.	περιφάνεια,	M 
7.242),	and	Cicero	also	talks	of	perspicuity (perspicuitas)	and	evidentness 
(evidentia)	 and	 of	 appearances	 being	 perspicuous (perspicuus)	 or	
evident (evidens, e. g.	Acad. 2.17,	 45–6).	As	mentioned	 above,	we	 also	
find	additional	 terms:	kataleptic	appearances	are	described	as	being	
striking	(πληκτική,	M. 258,	403),	intense (ἔντονος,	M. 7.408),	and	clear 
(τρανής,	M. 7.258,	404;	cf.	D.L.	7.46).




Bett	2005:	52),	 ‘evident’,	or	 indeed,	 ‘self-evident’	(e. g.	LS	1:	246),	but	
there	 are	 various	ways	of	 construing	what	 such	 talk	 amounts	 to.	 In	
particular,	 such	 terms	 might	 be	 used	 to	 express	 a	 phenomenological 








the	 phenomenological	 and	 the	 evidential,	 should	 not	 be	 conflated,	











the	Stoics	a	plausible	and	attractive	 thought.	 In	order	 to	apprehend	
something,	it	is	not	enough	to	be	right	or	have	the	right	sort	of	feeling 
(which	might	occur	by	blind	luck);	one	also	needs	something	more:	
one	 must	 also	 have	 the	 appropriate	 causal	 relationship	 with	 that	
which	one	is	right	about.33




makes	 two	 claims:	 first,	 that	 kataleptic	 appearances	 are	 of	 a	 kind	
and	 share	 a	 distinctive	 quality	 (which,	 relying	 on	 the	 other	 textual	




appearances	 share	 in	 common,	 beyond	 their	 being	 appropriately	
caused	(as	per	(i)),	and	being	accurate	(as	per	(ii)),	is	their	being	clear/
evident.	It	was	common	in	Hellenistic	philosophy	to	appeal	to	clarity/











35.	 Thus	 kataleptic	 appearances	 capture	 the	 peculiarities (ἰδιώματα)	 of	 their	
object(s)	(see	above),	but	they	also	have	their	own	peculiarity (ἰδίωμα):	being	
clear/evident	(M.	7.252).
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as	one	might	distinguish	one	 species	of	 snake	 from	another	on	 the	
basis	of	one	possessing	a	certain	kind	of	horn,	so	too	one	is	meant	to	




(e. g.	Acad.	2.33,	36,	51–4):	the	nota is	clarity/evidentness	(e. g.	Acad. 2.46).
What	 motivates	 externalist	 interpretations	 to	 attempt	 to	 explain	
away	 this	 internalist	 talk	 are	 two	 putative	 problems	 for	 internalist	
interpretations.	The	first	problem	raised	against	 internalist	accounts	
is	 (OBJ3).	 This	 proposes	 that	 the	 talk	 in	 our	 sources	 of	 kataleptic	
appearances	 causing	 automatic	 assent	 suggests	 externalism.41	 As	
we	 saw	 above,	 on	 Frede’s	doubly causal	 view,	 the	 distinctive	 feature	
of	kataleptic	appearances	was	their	causal	effect	upon	S;	a	kataleptic	
appearance	causes S to	assent	to	it.	Thus,	for	instance,	we	might	think	
of	 Sextus’s	 report:	 “this	 one	 [the	 kataleptic	 appearance],	 they	 say,	
being	evident	and	striking,	all	but	grabs	us	by	the	hair,	and	draws	us	
into	assent”	(αὕτη	γὰρ	ἐναργὴς	οὖσα	καὶ	πληκτικὴ	μόνον	οὐχὶ	τῶν	
τριχῶν,	φασί,	 λαμβάνεται,	 κατασπῶσα	ἡμᾶς	 εἰς	συγκατάθεσιν,	M. 
7.257;	cf.	Acad.	2.38).42 





appearances	 exert	 causal	 influence	 that	 operates	 outside	 of	 (to	 use	






42.	 Frede	(1983)	also	invokes	M. 7.405,	407;	Plut.	Adv. Col. 1121e,	1122c.	
In	order	to	maintain	externalism,	scholarly	interpretations	typically	
minimise	 attention	 to	 the	 textual	 evidence	 describing	 kataleptic	





not	 for	 the	 evidential	 aspect,	 and	 certainly	 not,	 I	 think,	 for	 the	
phenomenological	 aspect).39	 Construing	 talk	 of	 clarity,	 evidentness,	
and	 the	 like	 in	 an	 internalist	manner	 is	 natural	 (cf.	 Burnyeat	 1982:	


























ate	way,	 (ii)	 that	 it	 should	be	evidence	of	 something	else	 in	 that	Y	 can	be	
inferred	from	it”	(1982:	194).
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It	is	the	nature	of	the	mind	to	assent	to	truths,	to	dissent	




Wishful	 thinking,	 self-deception,	 and	 other	 similar	 phenomena	




strikes	 us	 as	 being	 extremely	 clear/evident.	 For	 clarity/evidentness 
or	strikingness	 to	act	as	reasons	 for	belief	 in	 the	way	described,	 they	
should,	 it	 seems,	be	accessible	 to	 the	agent	and	be	 taken	as	a	good	
indication	 that	 the	 appearance	 is	 true,	 and	 this	 is	 indeed	 suggested	
by	 Sextus’s	 own	words	 (“being	 evident	 and	 striking,	 […]	 [it]	 draws	
us	into	assent”,	M. 7.257	[see	above];	cf.	M. 7.403	[see	above]),	which	
imply	that	kataleptic	appearances	command	assent	precisely	because 
they	 are	 evident	 and	 striking	 (a	 feature	 which	 is	 accessible	 to	 the	
agent).	Thus,	contra	Frede,	talk	of	automatic	assent	is	not evidence	for	





from	 considerations	 of	 charity.	 In	 particular,	 (OBJ4)	 claims	 that	
internalist	 interpretations	 make	 the	 Stoics	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 vicious	
regress	 problem	 and	 hence	 that	 the	 externalist	 interpretation	 is	
45.	 τῷ	οὖν	φαινομένῳ ὅτι	οὐχ	ὑπάρχει	συγκατατίθεσθαι	οὐχ	οἷόν	τε.	διὰ	 τί; 













natural	 to	 regard	 these	propositions	 as	 commanding assent.	 This	 is	 a	




Such	 claims	 command	 assent	 because	 we	 cannot	 directly	 and	
spontaneously	 decide	 to	 disbelieve	 them.	Why	 not?	Well,	 precisely	
because	when	we	directly	deliberate	over	what	to	believe	we	aim	at	
truth	 and	 our	 deliberations	 yield	 to	 truth-conducive	 reasons	which	
are	accessible	to	us	and	inform	our	deliberation.	That is	presumably	
why	 these	 claims	 are	 difficult	 to	 doubt.	 The	 ancients	 also	 seem	 to	








told,	 “come	of	 themselves,	 they	say,	 to	our	cognisance”	 (καὶ	πρόδηλα	μὲν	
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purely	 externalist	 interpretation	 whereby	 kataleptic	 appearances	
are	distinguished	 in	virtue	of	 their	causal	effects	on	 the	subject	and	
the	 Stoics	 are	 saved	 from	 a	 vicious	 regress.	 However,	 despite	 its	
putative	importance,	precisely	how	the	regress	is	meant	to	go	is	not	
perspicuously	 presented	 by	 Frede	 or	 others.46	 I	 will	 focus	 here	 on	
Frede’s	account,	and	in	what	 follows	I	will	both	try	to	 formulate	the	
objection	more	precisely	and	provide	a	way	of	disarming	it.
In	 order	 for	 a	 regress	 objection,	 like	 that	 adduced	 by	 Frede,	 to	
have	any	force,	at	 least	two	things	must	be	shown.	One	is	that	the	
acceptance	 of	 certain	 assumptions	 generates	 an	 infinite	 sequence.	
The	 other	 is	 that	 the	 infinite	 sequence	 is	 objectionable	 because	
accepting	 the	 sequence/regress	 entails	 accepting	 a	 recognised	






Supposing	 Frede’s	 objection	 to	 be	 targeting	 precisely	 the	 sort	
of	 interpretation	 that	 I	 am	 here	 defending	 (i. e.	 construing	 Frede’s	
objection	 as	 strongly	 as	 possible	 against	 my	 position),	 namely	 an	






tion.	My	own	 interpretation	 of	 the	 problem	and	 solution	 are	 substantially	
different.
47.	 There	are,	of	course,	infinite	sequences/regresses	which	are	not	objection-
able.	 For	 instance,	 take	 the	 following	 seemingly	 innocuous	 principle:	 for	
any	proposition	p, if	p,	 then	 it	 is	 true	 that	p. Acceptance	of	 this	principle	
generates	an	 infinite	 series	of	 truths	 for	each	proposition	 that	 is	 the	case	
and	many	of	us	see	this	as	being	no	more	objectionable	than	there	being	an	
infinite	set	of	natural	numbers.
preferable.	 In	 response	 it	 must	 first be	 emphasised	 that	 even if	 the	
regress	objection	were	effective	against	the	Stoics,	this	is	a	poor	reason	









If	 they	[i. e.	 the	Stoics]	had	 taken	this	 [internalist]	view,	
they	 would	 have	 opened	 themselves	 to	 the	 charge	 of	
an	 infinite	 regress.	 For	 we	 would	 have	 to	 ask	 what	 is	
supposed	to	guarantee	 the	 truth	of	 the	 impression	that	
a	 given	 impression	 has	 this	 distinctive	 feature.	 Quite	
generally,	 the	 criterion	will	only	 fulfil	 its	 role	 if	 it	does	
not	 require	 the	 judgment	 that	 an	 impression	 is	 of	 a	
certain	kind.	For	this	will	always	raise	the	question	how	
this	judgment	is	to	be	certified.	The	Stoic	theory,	I	want	
to	 suggest,	 escapes	 this	 [regress]	 difficulty	 because	
it	 assumes	 that	 the	 distinctive	 feature	 of	 cognitive	
impressions	is	a	causal	feature	of	impressions	such	that	
cognitive	impressions	play	their	criterial	role	not	through	




ad infinitum.	 The	 putative	 regress	 ensuing	 from	 internalism	 is	 often	
granted	 special	weight	 as	 an	 objection	 to	 internalist	 interpretations	
in	the	scholarship	(e. g.	Reinhardt	2011:	299–300),	and	it	is	seemingly	
as	 a	 result	 of	 this	 problem	 that	 Frede	 goes	 on	 to	 offer	 his	 own	
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Second,	 supposing	 that	 (PERMPRINC)	 is	 maintained	 and	 an	
infinite	sequence	is	generated,	 it	 is	not	clear	(as	should	be	apparent	
from	I–VII	above)	that	the	regress	is	objectionable.	If	the	generation	
of	 an	 infinite	 series	 is	meant	 to	 function	 as	 a	 reductio	 (as	 supposed	
by	 the	 proponents	 of	 (OBJ4)),	 then	 one	would	 have	 to	 say	what	 is	
so	 objectionable	 about	 the	 infinite	 series	 in	 question.	 After	 all,	 we	
can	 see	 above	 that	 no	 contradiction	 is	 produced	 (nor	will	 one	 be).	
What	 absurdity	 or	 otherwise	 undesirable	 result	 follows	 from	 these	
assumptions	then?	Here	those,	like	Frede,	who	think	the	regress	poses	
a	problem	must,	I	think,	stumble.	It	is	not	clear	(forgive	the	expression)	
that	 there	 is	 anything	 particularly	 objectionable	 about	 infinitely	
higher-order	clarity.	We	might,	 for	 instance,	 take	the	“it	 is	clear	 that”	
operator	to	function	like	the	“it	is	true	that”	operator	(discussed	above)	
49.	 This	point	will	apply	to	numerous	other	interpretations	of	Frede’s	objection;	





















II.			KA   [assumption]
III.		CA∧K(CA)	 	 [from	I,	II]





























not	merely	 fulfil	what	 is	 required	by	 the	 rule	unintentionally),	 then	
S requires	 a	 rule	 or	method	 that	S can	 follow	directly.	 For	 instance,	
suppose	 that	S is	 commanded	simply	 to	believe	an	appearance	 that	
p iff the	appearance	that	p is	appropriately	caused	(true,	etc.).	In	order	
to	pursue	 this	goal,	either	S must	be	able	 to	 tell	directly	whether	an	
appearance	 is	 appropriately	 caused	 (true,	 etc.)	or S must	be	 able	 to	
follow	 some	 other	 rule	 so	 as	 to	 be	 able	 tell	 indirectly	 whether	 an	
appearance	 is	 appropriately	 caused	 (true,	 etc.).	 If	 neither	 of	 these	






follow	the	rule	(which	permits	S to	accept	notes	iff they	are	genuine),	S 
requires	a	rule	which	S can	follow	directly.	A	bank	note’s	causal	history	








or	else	 like	 the	necessity	operator	 in	S4	modal	 logic.	The	S4	system	
(among	 the	weaker	modal	 logics)	 is	 characterised	by	 acceptance	 of	
the	S4	axiom,	which	makes	(□p⊃□□p)	a	tautology.50	In	such	a	system,	
□p is	equivalent	to	□□p	(and	□□□p is	equivalent	to	□□p	and	thus	to	□p, 
and	so	too	with	□□□□p,	etc.).	That	there	should	be	such	equivalence	








=	LS	39B;	M. 7.163).52	Thus,	 the	putative	 regress	 adduced	by	 (OBJ4)	
would	pose	no	problem.
In	 sum:	 there	 are	 various	 responses	 to	 (OBJ4).	 The	 first	 is	
that,	 supposing	 that	 there	 were	 some	 vicious	 regress,	 this	 would	
be	 a	 problem	 not	 for	 internalist	 interpretations	 of	 the	 Stoics	 but	
rather	—	given	our	textual	evidence	—	for	the	Stoics.	The	second	is	that	
it	is	not	clear	that	an	infinite	regress,	regardless	of	what	we	take	the	
regress	 to	 be,	 is	 in	 fact	 generated.	 The	 third	 is	 that,	 supposing	 that	
Frede’s	 regress	 objection	 targets	 clarity/evidentness	 (the	 feature	 to	




51.	 ‘Self-presenting’	 is	 Chisholm’s	 term	 (e.	g.	 1966:	 27–9);	 ‘self-revealing’	 is	
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as	 to	why	sometimes	agents	 fail	 to	assent	 to	kataleptic	appearances	
despite	their	being	clear.56
The	first	 is	 to	explain	 lack	of	 assent	 through	 incoherence.	While	
A might	 be	 (phenomenologically)	 clear/evident	 to	 S, S might	 not	
assent	to	A because	A	does	not	cohere	with	S’s	convictions. The	cases	
discussed	 in	 Sextus	 wherein	 clear	 (kataleptic)	 appearances	 are	 not	






plausibly,	 Admetus	 failed	 to	 assent	 to	 the	 kataleptic	 appearance	 of	
Alcestis	being	before	him	because	it	was	inconsistent	with	his	other	
beliefs	 (e. g.	 that	 Alcestis	 was	 dead,	 that	 dead	 people	 do	 not	 walk	














proposal	put	 forward	by	Brittain	(one	which	 I	do	not	discuss)	 is	 that	one	
might	fail	to	assent	to	kataleptic	appearances	owing	to	a	temporary	strategy	
of	withholding	assent	due	 to	 taking	oneself	 to	be	under	 the	 influence	of	
mind-altering	 illness	 or	 drug.	 Although	we	 are,	 I	 think,	 largely	 in	 agree-
ment,	Brittain’s	treatment	focuses	on	why	kataleptic	appearances	might	fail	
to	secure	assent	while	leaving	open	how	apprehension	and	the	kataleptic	
appearance	should	be	 interpreted.	 In	contrast,	my	own	discussion	 in	 this	
section	 focuses	on	why	one	would	not	assent	 to	an	appearance	which	 is	
clear/evident	(understood	in	an	internalist	manner).












rebus insistis, Acad. 2.94).54	If	clarity/evidentness	were	not	accessible	to	
the	epistemic	agent,	how	could	one	follow	this	advice	(cf.	Acad. 2.36)?
4. All and Only Kataleptic Appearances are Clear
The	principal	difficulty	for	the	Stoic	account	lies	not	in	accounting	for	
the	 possibility	 of	 how	one	 can	 tell	whether	 an	 appearance	 is	 clear/
evident	(see	the	defence	provided	above)	but	rather	in	attempting	to	
account	for	why	an	appearance	should	be	clear/evident	iff it	is	kataleptic	
(i. e.	why	all	 and	only	kataleptic	 appearances	are	 clear/evident)	 and	
why	an	appearance	which	is	not	kataleptic	(or	appropriately	caused) 
could not be	clear/evident	(e. g.	Acad. 2.34,	84).55 
We	might	begin	by	wondering	whether	all	kataleptic	appearances	
are	 indeed	 clear/evident.	 The	 admission	 of	 cases,	 such	 as	 that	 of	
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kataleptic	 appearances	 in	 virtue	 of	 lack	 of	 attention	may	well	 have	
held	a	strong	appeal	for	the	Stoics.	Supposing	attention	to	be	within	
our	 control	 (a	 plausible	 assumption),	 the	 Stoics	would	 have	 a	 neat	
explanation	for	why	assent	is	up	to	us	(cf.	Acad. 1.40)	and	why	we	may	








to	 be	 clear/evident?	 Here	 we	 find	 that	 opponents	 of	 the	 Stoics	
appealed	 to	non-kataleptic	 appearances	which	were	 inappropriately	
caused	 or	 inaccurate	 but	which	were	 subjectively	 indistinguishable	
from	kataleptic	appearances	(e. g.	Acad. 2.33	–4,	41–2).	As	is	traditional	
in	 such	 cases,	 appeals	 to	 dreams	 played	 an	 important	 role	 (Acad. 
2.47–8).	 The	 sort	 of	 dreaming	 arguments	we	 are	 familiar	with	 from	
Descartes	typically	assume	that	dreams	may	have	the	same	intrinsic	
features	as	 instances	of	perception.	Proponents	of	dream	arguments	
may	 suppose	 (A)	 that	 every	 instance	 of	 perception	 is	 such	 that	 it	
is	 possible	 to	 have	 a	 non-perceptual	 (e. g.	 dreaming)	 experience	
subjectively	indistinguishable	from	it.	However,	all	that	is	required	to	
endanger	the	Stoic	account	(and	their	desire	for	an	infallible criterion)	
is	 the	weaker	 and	more	plausible	 claim:	 (B)	 that	 some	 instances	of	






are	 subjectively	 indistinguishable	 from	 instances	 of	 perception	 (i. e.	
from	perceptual	 kataleptic	 appearances).	This	has	 seemed	plausible	
to	many,	 and	 the	Academics	 invite	 us	 to	 share	 this	 view	 by	 asking	
etc.).	Self-presentingly	clear/evident	as	an	appearance	might	be,	if	its	
content	 is	obviously	 inconsistent	with	deeply	held	beliefs,	 it	 is	easy	
to	 see	why	 these	 appearances	 are	not	 accompanied	by	 assent.	One	
might	 see,	 and	 see	 (phenomenologically)	 clearly/evidently,	 and	 yet	
not	believe.
A	second	explanation	of	why	one	might	fail	to	assent	to	kataleptic	
appearances	 is	 somewhat	 more	 tentative	 and	 turns	 on	 attention	





clear/evident	without	one	being	entirely	or	 sufficiently	 aware	of	 its	
(e. g.	 phenomenological)	 clarity/evidentness	 is	 a	 possibility	 raised	
by	 Lucullus	 in	 the	 Academica:	 “It	 is	 first	 charged	 that	 people	 focus	
and	 concentrate	 their	 minds	 too	 little	 on	 those	 things	 which	 are	
perspicuous	 for	 them	 to	 realize	 in	how	much	 light	 those	 things	are	
surrounded”	 (Adversatur enim primum quod parum defigunt animos et 








compatible	 and	 indeed	 complementary	 insofar	 as	 one	 can	 see	why	
one	 might	 not	 pay	 too	 much	 attention	 to	 an	 appearance’s	 clarity	
if	 that	 appearance	 does	 not	 fit	 one’s	 evidence	 or	 convictions.58 
One	 final	 point	 should	 be	made	 here:	 explaining	 lack	 of	 assent	 to	








There	 is	 one	 defence	 against	 all	 empty	 appearances	
(inania visa),60	whether	they	are	fashioned	by	imagination,	
which	 we	 admit	 often	 occurs,	 or	 whether	 in	 sleep,	 or	
through	wine	or	insanity.	For	we	will	say	that	perspicuity	
(perspicuitas),	which	we	must	 cling	 to	with	our	 teeth,	 is	
absent	 from	all	 appearances	 of	 that	 sort.	After	 all,	who,	
when	 imagining	 something	 to	 himself	 or	 depicting	
something	 through	his	 imagination,	 is	not	aware	of	 the	
difference	between	perspicuous	and	empty	[appearances]	
once	 he	 has	 roused	 and	 come	 to	 himself?	 The	 same	
response	applies	to	dreams	(Acad. 2.51).61
While	the	Stoics	might	have	argued	that	dreams	(and	hallucinations)	
typically	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	 content	 as	 waking	 experience	 (e. g.	
we	often	dream	of	dragons	and	 the	 like),	 they	 focus	 instead	on	 the	
(putative)	 fact	 that	 such	 experiences	 are	 not	 phenomenologically the	
same	 as	 waking	 experiences;	 dreams	 and	 waking	 experience	 are	
not	 intrinsically indistinguishable.	 In	 particular,	 dreams	 (and	 other	
non-veridical	 experiences	 of	 a	 similar	 sort)	 are	 not	 clear/evident.	
The	 sceptic	might	here	 interpose:	 If	dreams	and	waking	experience	
are	 intrinsically	 distinguishable,	 then	 why	 can’t	 we	 tell	 them	 apart	
(Acad.	 2.52)?62	 The	 Stoic	 response	 lies	 in	 pointing	 out	 that	 such	
60. I. e.	φαντάσματα	(Aetius	4.12.1–5	=	LS	39B).
61. Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive illa cogitatione informan-
tur, quod fieri solere concedimus, siue in quiete siue per vinum sive per insaniam. 
Nam ab omnibus eius modi visis perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, 
abesse dicemus. Quis enim, cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul 
ac se ipse commovit atque ad se revocauit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et 
inania? Eadem ratio est somiuorum (Acad.	2.51).
62.	 “But	while	we	are	having	 them,	 their	 ‘look’	 (species, cf.	Acad.	 2.58)	during	
sleep	is	the	same	as	that	of	the	things	we	see	when	we	are	awake!”	(At enim 




Academic	 proposes	—	to	 provoke	 our	 assent.	 Surely	 (the	 thought	

























The	Stoic	 response	 to	 the	 appeal	 to	dreams	 seems	 to	have	been	
similar	to	that	of	Austin	(1962:	42ff).	They	reject	the	assumption	that	
59. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in 
communi signo notari non potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod uolo; 
id enim quaero, quod ita mihi uideatur uerum, ut non possit item falsum uideri.











Because	 of	 the	mechanism	 at	work.	 By	 invoking	 the	mechanism	of	
being impressed in	 (ii),	we	have	 an	 indication	 that	 the	 appearance	 is	
accurate	and	clear	precisely	because it	is	appropriately	caused.
The	 analogy	 one	 might	 draw	 is	 then	 as	 follows:	 think	 back	 on	
photographs	 in	 the	 days	 before	 digital	 tomfoolery.	 Given	 the	 way	
that	film	reacts	to	light	and	how	cameras	operate	(i. e.	certain	causal	




film	 to	 react	 in	 the	 right	 sort	 of	way.	 Similarly,	 if	 the	photograph	 is	





The	 analogy	provides	 some	 reason	 to	 suppose	 that,	 if	 they	occur	
at	all,	the	relevant	features	(appropriate	causal	history,	accuracy,	and	
clarity)	 regularly	 coincide	 in	 kataleptic	 appearances.	 However,	 even 






a	 question	 is	 prompted	 by	 a	 hasty	 assumption.	 While	 we	 cannot	
distinguish	 between	 dreams	 and	 waking	 experience	 when	 we	 are	
asleep,	 this	 does	 not	 indicate	 that	 dreaming	 and	 being	 awake	 are	
intrinsically	indistinguishable	(i. e.	qualitatively	identical	with	respect	
to	intrinsic	qualities);	we	should	resist	such	a	hasty	conflation	(Acad. 
2.50).	Rather,	 on	 the	 Stoic	 view,	 dreams	 and	waking	 experience	are 
intrinsically	distinguishable	—	it	is	just	that	in	sleep	we	are	cognitively	
impaired;	 even	 though	 the	 appearances	 are	 not	 clear/evident,	 we	
are	 taken	 in	and	assent	 to	 them	(cf.	M. 7.247).	That	 the	experiences	
are	 intrinsically	distinguishable	 is	 (they	think)	easily	shown:	we	can 














of	 why	 one	 might	 think	 that	 dream	 appearances	 are	 clear/evident	
when	in	fact	they	are	not.	However,	 it	 fails	to	show	that	dreams	are	
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account	marries	a	causal	stipulation,	favoured	by	purely	externalist	
interpretations,	 with	 an	 internalist	 element:	 clarity/evidentness. A	
kataleptic	appearance	must	be	caused	by	the	object	of	the	appearance,	
but	kataleptic	appearances	are	also	clear/evident.	It	is	in	virtue	of	this	
last	 feature,	 which	 is	 accessible	 to	 the	 epistemic	 agent,	 that	 there	
exists	a	procedure	which	agents	can	follow	so	as	to	attain	truths	and	
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speeds,	 doctored	 photographs,	 and	 the	 like.	 Photographs	 of	 flying	
saucers	 are	neither	 caused	by	flying	 saucers	nor	do	 they	 accurately	
reflect	the	world.	Further,	even	if	we	were	to	suppose	for	a	second	that	
there	were	no	such	deficient	photographs,	 there	remains	the	simple	





but	 cannot	 be	 deemed	 an	 unqualified	 success.	 While	 the	 Stoics’	
disarming	 of	 the	 Academic	 dreaming	 argument	 offers	 a	 plausible	
explanation	of	why	one	might	think	dreams	(and	also	hallucinations)	
are	 clear/evident	when	 in	 fact	 they	 are	not,	 and	 some	 story	 can	be	
told	 wherein	 causal	 history,	 accuracy,	 and	 clarity	 regularly	 occur	
together,	 this	 falls	 short	 of	 what	 is	 needed	 to	 defeat	 the	 sceptics’	

















	 tamer	nawar The Stoic Account of Apprehension
philosophers’	imprint	 –		21		– vol.	14,	no.	29	(october	2014)
Perin,	C.	 (2005).	 ‘Stoic	 Epistemology	 and	 the	Limits	 of	 Externalism’,	
Ancient Philosophy	25,	383	–401.
Reed,	 B.	 (2002).	 ‘The	 Stoics’	 Account	 of	 the	 Cognitive	 Impression’,	
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy	23,	147–180.
Reinhardt,	T.	(2011).	‘Galen	on	Unsayable	Properties’,	Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy 40,	297–317.
Sedley,	 D.	 (2002).	 ‘Zeno’s	 Definition	 of	 Phantasia Kataleptike’,	 in	 T.	
Scaltsas	and	A.S.	Mason	(eds.).	Zeno of Citium and His Legacy: The 
Philosophy of Zeno (Larnaca:	Municipality	of	Larnaca),	133–154.
Shapiro,	S.	(2009).	‘We	Hold	These	Truths	to	be	Self-Evident:	but	What	
Do	We	Mean	by	That?’,	The Review of Symbolic Logic	2,	175–207.
Striker,	 G.	 (1990).	 ‘The	 Problem	 of	 the	 Criterion’,	 in	 S.	 Everson	
(ed.).	 Epistemology: Companions to Ancient Thought 1	 (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press),	143–160.
———.	 (1996).	 ‘κριτήριον	 τῆς	 ἀληθείας’,	 in	 id.,	Essays on Hellenistic 




Bett,	 R.	 (2005).	 Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press).
Bobzien,	 S.	 (2011).	 ‘If	 It’s	Clear,	Then	 It’s	Clear	That	 It’s	Clear,	 or	 Is	
It?	Higher-Order	Vagueness	and	the	S4	Axiom’,	in	B.	Morison	and	




Brittain,	 C.	 (2006).	Cicero: On Academic Scepticism	 (Indianapolis	 and	
Cambridge:	Hackett).	
———.	 (2011).	 ‘Posidonius’	 Theory	 of	 Predictive	 Dreams’,	 Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 40,	213–236.	
———.	 (2014).	 ‘The	Compulsions	of	Stoic	Assent’,	 in	M.K.	Lee	(ed.).	




and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice	(Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press),	193–238.
Chisholm,	 R.	M.	 (1966).	Theory of Knowledge (Englewood	Cliffs,	 N.J.:	
Prentice	Hall).
Frede,	M.	(1983).	‘Stoics	and	Skeptics	on	Clear	and	Distinct	Impressions’,	
in	M.	Burnyeat	(ed.).	The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley:	University	of	
California	Press),	65–93.	
———.	(1999).	‘Stoic	Epistemology’,	in	K.	Algra,	J.	Barnes,	J.	Mansfeld,	
and	 M.	 Schofield	 (eds.).	 The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press), 295	–322.
Goldman,	 A.	I.	 (1967).	 ‘A	 Causal	 Theory	 of	 Knowing’,	 The Journal of 
Philosophy 64,	357–372.
Lefebvre,	R.	(2007).	 ‘Représentation	et	évidence:	les	Stoïciens	face	à	
leurs	adversaires	de	l’Académie’,	Elenchos	18,	337–367.
Long,	A.A.	and	D.N.	Sedley	(eds.)	(1987).	The Hellenistic Philosophers,	2	
vols.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press).
